The agreement income of each project depends on the fee structure of the agreement itbitcoin kaufen redditself. Different income models complicate the calculation of agreement income. Below is an overview of the agreement revenue calculations for four NFT and DeFi projects.
Although the goal of XCM is universal, flexible and future-oriented, it bittorrent android descargasmust of course meet actual needs, especially the transfer of tokens between chains. Throughout the DeFi world, optional fee payment is very common. You can use the XCM language to perform some specific operations.Importantly, there are many token transfer models that we hope to support: it may only be necessary to simply control the account on the remote chain, allowing the local chain to have an address on the remote chain to receive funds and ultimately transfer the funds under its control to that remote In other accounts on the chain.
But there may be two consensus systems in this process, both of which are specific token systems. For example, tokens such as USDT or USDC have instances on several different chains and are completely interchangeable. It should be possible to destroy such tokens on one chain and mint corresponding tokens on another supported chain. In XCM, it can be called teleport, because the transfer of assets is actually achieved by destroying it on one side and creating a clone on the other side.The core of the XCM format is XCVM. This stands for cross-consensus virtual machine. This is an ultra-high-level non-Turing complete computer whose instructions are designed to be roughly at the same level as transactions.The "message" in XCM is actually just a program running on XCVM. It is one or more XCM commands. The program will continue to execute, and will not end and stop until it runs to the end or encounters an error.The position in XCM is hierarchical, and some parts of the consensus are completely encapsulated into separate parts. For example, the Parachain of Polkadot completely exists in the internal position of the entire Polkadot consensus. As long as there is any change in one consensus system, it means a change in another consensus system, and the former system is the internal system of the latter.When working in XCM, it is usually necessary to quote some kind of asset. This is because almost all existing public blockchains rely on some native digital assets to provide the backbone for their internal economic and security mechanisms. For proof-of-work blockchains such as Bitcoin, native assets (BTC) are used to reward miners who develop the blockchain and prevent double spending. For proof-of-stake blockchains such as Polkadot, native assets (DOT) are used as a form of collateral, and network administrators (called equity holders) must take risks to generate valid blocks and obtain physical rewards.
Expense payment in XCM is a very important use case. Most parachains in the Polkadot community will require their interlocutors to pay for any operations they wish to perform to avoid "spam" and DDOS.When chains have good reasons to believe that their interlocutors are trustworthy, they can also not pay. For example, this is the case when the Polkadot relay chain communicates with the Polkadot Statemint public interest chain. However, in general, fees are a good way to ensure that XCM messages and their transmission protocols will not be overused.Speed: The delay time of transaction completion, and the guarantee of final certainty. There is usually a trade-off between speed and safety.
Connectivity: The choice of target chains for users and developers, and the different difficulty levels of integrating additional target chains.Capital efficiency: economic mechanism, which sets the transaction cost of capital and asset transfer required to ensure the security of the system.Statefulness: The ability to transfer specific assets, more complex states, and/or perform cross-chain contract calls.In summary, the trade-offs of these three design mechanisms can be evaluated from the perspective of the following figure:
In addition, security is a scope, we can roughly divide it into the following categories:Trust-less: The security of the bridge is bound to the underlying blockchain it bridges. Unless the underlying blockchain is attacked by consensus-level attacks, users' funds will not be lost or stolen. In other words, this is not complete trustlessness, because all the economic, engineering, and cryptographic components of these systems contain trust assumptions (for example, there are no loopholes in the code).
Insured (Insured): Attackers can steal user funds, but they may be unprofitable in doing so. Because they need to provide collateral to participate in the network, and they will be punished for wrongdoing and malicious behavior. If the user's funds are lost, the agreement will compensate the user by confiscation of the attacker's collateral.Bonded (Bonded): Similar to the insurance model (for example, the economic benefits of participants are closely related to their behavior), except that the user's collateral is forfeited due to his mistakes and malicious behavior. The type of collateral is important for both the insurance and the mortgage model; endogenous collateral (protocol tokens as collateral) is more risky, because if the bridge fails, the value of the token is also likely to collapse, which further reduces Security guarantee for bridging.Trusted: Participants do not need to mortgage assets, and users cannot retrieve assets when the system fails or commits malicious behavior. Therefore, security mainly depends on the reputation of the bridge operator."External validators and federalism" are generally better in terms of state and connectivity because they can trigger transactions, store data, and allow data to interact with any number of target chains. However, this comes at the cost of security, because by definition, users rely on the security of the bridge rather than the source or target chain. Although most of the current external validator mechanisms are based on trust models, some require collateralized assets, and a subset of assets is used to insure end users. Unfortunately, their insurance mechanisms are usually reflexive. If the agreement token is used as collateral, it is assumed that the value of the token is sufficient to compensate the user's loss. In addition, if the mortgage asset is different from the insurance asset, it will also depend on the price flow of the oracle, so the security of the bridge will be downgraded to that of the oracle. If a trust model is not required, these bridges are also the least capital efficient, because they promote economic throughput and also need to scale up the scale of collateral.
"Light client and relay" is also better in terms of state, because the block header relay system can transmit any type of data. Although there are liveness assumptions due to the need for repeaters to transmit information, they are also very safe because they do not require additional trust assumptions. At the same time, they are the most capital efficient bridges because there is no need to lock any assets. However, these advantages come at the expense of connectivity. Every time a pair of chains is connected, the developer must deploy a new light client smart contract on the source chain and the target chain. The complexity of the contract is between O(LogN) and O(N) (the reason is between this The scope is because it is relatively easy to add chain support using the same consensus algorithm). There is also a significant speed flaw in the optimistic model that relies on fraud proofs, which may increase the delay to 4 hours."Liquidity networks" are strong in terms of security and speed because they are locally verified systems (that is, global consensus is not required). They are also more capital efficient than the external validator mechanism of the mortgage/insurance mechanism, because capital efficiency is related to transaction flow/volume, rather than security. For example, assuming that the transaction flows of the two chains are equal, and given a built-in rebalancing mechanism, the liquidity network can contribute to an arbitrarily large economic throughput.The trade-off lies in the state, because although the call data can be transmitted, its function is limited. For example, they can interact with data across chains, where the receiver has the right to interact based on the provided data (for example, using the signature information from the sender to call a smart contract), but there is no "owner" of the data for the transmission or the transmission belongs to Generalized state data (such as minting representative tokens) is not helpful.Building a strong cross-chain bridge is a difficult problem in distributed systems. Although there have been many attempts in this field, there are still some problems to be solved:
Finality & rollbacks: In a chain with probabilistic finality, how does bridging deal with block reorganization and time thief attacks? For example, if any chain has experienced a state rollback, what will happen to users who send themselves from Polkadot to Ethereum?NFT transfers & provenance: How can bridges trace the provenance of NFT across multiple chains? For example, if there is an NFT that has transacted in multiple markets of Ethereum, Flow, and Solana, how are all these transactions and owners recorded?
Stress testing: In the case of chain congestion or protocol and network level attacks, how will various bridge designs respond?Although bridging unlocks more innovation possibilities for the blockchain ecosystem, if the team takes shortcuts in R&D, it may also bring great risks. The Poly Network cross-chain attack event has shown us the potential economic loss scale of vulnerabilities and attacks, and I estimate that there will be more large-scale attacks in the future. Although for bridge builders, the current network is highly fragmented and competition is fierce. But each team should be highly self-disciplined and prioritize security rather than release speed.
Although the ultimate ideal state is to build a "isomorphic bridge" shared by all things, the reality is that there is probably no single "best" bridge design. Different types of bridges will be suitable for different specific applications (such as asset transfer, contract invocation, token minting, etc.).In addition, the best bridge should be the most secure, connectable, fast, capital efficient, cost-effective, and censorship-resistant. If we want to realize the vision of the "blockchain internet", these attributes need to be maximized by us.So far, we have not constructed the optimal bridge. There are several interesting research directions for all bridging types:Reducing the cost of block header verification: The cost of block header verification for light clients is very high. If this problem can be solved, it will bring us closer to achieving fully universal and trustless interoperability. An interesting design is to bridge to L2 to reduce these costs. For example, implement the Tendermint light client on zkSync.Shift from a trust-based model to a mortgage model: Although the capital efficiency of mortgage verifiers is much lower, the security of "social contracts" is not enough to protect billions of dollars in user funds. In addition, the fancy threshold signature mechanism does not reduce trust; this group of signers still belongs to a trusted third party. Without collateral, users actually hand over their assets to an external custodian.Change from a mortgage model to an insurance model: Loss of assets is the last thing users want to encounter. Although verifiers and repeaters of mortgage assets can prevent malicious behavior to a certain extent, the agreement should go further and directly use the confiscated funds to compensate users.
Expanding the liquidity of the liquidity network: The "liquidity network" can be said to be the fastest bridge for asset transfer, and there are some interesting design trade-offs between trust and liquidity. For example, the liquidity network may be able to use the mortgage verifier model to outsource capital supply, where routing may also be a threshold multi-signature with mortgage liquidity.Bridge aggregation: Although the use of bridges may follow the law of exponential for a specific asset, an aggregator like Li Finance can improve the experience of developers and end users.
Nowadays, many GameFi projects continue to emerge, and provide a variety of participation methods and play-to-earn and pledge functions. So, how to judge which projects can be held for a long time and can add value? How to find potential NFT agreements?The calculation of agreement income is the focus of value investment.
First of all, let's take a look at what is the agreement income? What is the difference with income?Let me talk about the definition of revenue. Revenue measures the return of all participants, that is, the total cost paid to the contract supplier. For example, the fees paid to liquidity providers in AMM, the transaction fees of decentralized exchanges, and the amount of interest on the lending platform in DeFi. Revenue is obtained by charging a rate to the total flow of the agreement. Simply put, revenue refers to the total fees paid by end users of blockchain or decentralized applications. These revenues will eventually be distributed to token holders, liquidity holders and protocol libraries.
GMV (Gross merchandise volume) refers to the total flow of the agreement, which represents the transaction volume of the blockchain or the transaction volume and borrowing volume of decentralized applications. For decentralized exchanges, GMV is the total transaction volume, and for lending agreements, GMV is the total borrowing volume.The fee rate is the fee charged to GMV, which can be the transaction fee of the blockchain, the transaction fee of Dapp, or the interest rate of the loan.Income calculation formula:GMV * Take Rate = Revenue
Total transaction volume * rate = project revenue (total fees paid)The total revenue is distributed between the agreement and its Token holders and supplier participants (miners/validators, liquidity providers, lenders, etc.). For early-stage projects, 100% of the revenue is usually distributed directly to supplier participants. In the long run, the revenue sharing model will be more diversified, and the agreement and its owners can also get a share of the total revenue.
Agreement revenue represents the cash flow of the agreement. The agreement collects costs from users and is calculated as a percentage of total revenue.The difference between agreement income and income
Revenue is the amount that users pay for the use of the contracted service. These revenues are obtained by the supplier participants who provide the basic service, and the contractual revenue refers to the amount of revenue actually obtained by the Token. This actually represents the bottom value of the agreement, which is the profit margin. In other words, just as early-stage startups and growth companies do not pay dividends to shareholders, not every agreement allocates cash flow to Token.Cost refers to how much of the agreement income is used for grants, wages, and audit fees. That is, the sum of all costs and expenses paid according to the implemented on-chain governance recommendations.
Income: How much funds are distributed to Token holders as dividends, ie = agreement income-cost and difference.To sum up in one sentence, revenue is the amount that users pay to the agreement, which is mainly the income brought by the provider of the underlying service, and the agreement income is the cumulative income brought by Token. Agreement revenue represents profit and is the basis of the agreement.The agreement income of each project depends on the fee structure of the agreement itself. Different income models complicate the calculation of agreement income. Below is an overview of the agreement revenue calculations for four NFT and DeFi projects.How is agreement income distributed to token holders?
Take the example of MakerDao. Makerdao issues Dai to collateral providers, and users need to repay the principal and pay fees when unlocking the collateral. After the fees are paid to the agreement, they will be accumulated in the agreement's internal balance sheet. When the accumulated fees reach 10,000,000u Dai, they will be auctioned to obtain the agreement's governance token MKR. After that, MKR is burned (aka destroyed), thereby reducing the circulation of MKR. This process will be repeated continuously.Participants of agreement income
The four types of participants in the distribution agreement income are classified as follows:Any supplier participant (LP, lender, miner, keeper/liquidator);
Any demand-side participant (DSR depositor, Nexus Mutual claimant);Supplier participants who own tokens (PoS verifier, 0x MM, Keep signer);